Economics and National Security: A History of Their Interaction (1991)

Economics and National Security: A History of Their Interaction. Edited by Craufurd D. Goodwin. Supplement to volume 23 of HOPE. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

"Introduction," by Craufurd D. Goodwin (pp. 1–3). Although national security and international conflict are ever-present concerns, today's economists have paid little attention to them.

"Preclassical Perceptions of Economy and Security," by S. Todd Lowry (pp. 5–21). Despite a rhetorically dominant naturalistic ideology and legitimate concern for the industrial productivity of the economy, when it comes to matters of national security, most economists have merely reinforced and augmented individual information and rationality.

"National Security in Classical Political Economy," by Craufurd D. Goodwin (pp. 23–35). For the most part, classical economists treated the issue of conflict in familiar "economizing" ways, sometimes postulating that the benefits of war outweighed the costs, sometimes offering advice on efficiency questions during times of war.

"The Economics of Defense in British Political Economy, 1848–1914," by John K. Whitaker (pp. 37–60). Paucity is the most striking feature of British writing on the economics of defense circa 1900, as the general economic treatises of the era pay little or no attention to the question.

"British and American Economists and Attempts to Comprehend the Nature of War, 1910–20," by William J. Barber (pp. 61–86). Economists believed that economic research and analysis could make an important contribution to the minimization—if not the elimination—of friction between nation-states, with such developments as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace spurring economists to address the problem of war.

"Thorstein Veblen on War, Peace, and National Security," by Jeff E. Biddle and Warren J. Samuels (pp. 87–117). Veblen's analysis supports the view that terms such as "national defense" and "national security" are euphemisms for the inevitable state of affairs under the predatory nation-state, as well as the ideological and material interests that cloak themselves in the discourse of patriotism.

"Pareto on Conflict Resolution and National Security," by Vincent J. Tarascio (pp. 119–30). In Pigou's view, the economic universe of the political economy of peace and the political economy of war were not subject to the same rules and should be sharply differentiated—in short, war offers little understanding of an economy at peace.

"From the Economics of Welfare to the Economics of Warfare (and Back) in the Thought of A. C. Pigou," by William J. Barber (pp. 131–42). Pigou was one of the few major economists who produced a book-length treatise on war, believing that a more thorough comprehension of the "anatomy and physiology" of a mobilized economy could contribute to the nation's security in the event of a future war.

"League of Nations Economists and the Ideal of Peaceful Change in the Decade of the 'Thirties," by Neil de Marchi (pp. 143–78). The League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service brought together a changing group of economists who individually were as creative as any of their contemporaries and who collectively shaped international discussions on trade and economic policy.

"The Political Economy of Adolf Hitler: Power, Plenty, and Ideology," by Lawrence Birken (pp. 179–89). Hitlerism possessed elements of a political economy that gave a logical basis to Hitler's two aims: the conquest of living space and the elimination of the Jews.

"Marxist and Soviet Defense Economics, 1848–1927," by Christopher Mark Davis (pp. 191–225). By the mid-1920s, defense economics was well developed in the USSR, and even though it was usually treated in a scholarly manner, Soviet works still contained some Marxist-Leninist conceptions of the economy and the military.

"When Games Grow Deadly Serious: The Military Influence on the Evolution of Game Theory," by Philip Mirowski (pp. 227–55). The connections between the military and game theory were numerous and pervasive in the first two decades of game theory's existence, extending into the very mathematics itself.

"Game," by Donald Barthelme (pp. 257–60). [Short story.]

"War as a 'Simple Economic Problem': The Rise of an Economics of Defense," by Robert J. Leonard (pp. 261–83). The impact of basic economic thought in defense circles had grown without interruption for 30 years but with little effect on the economics discipline itself, perhaps because few could calmly approach strategic analysis, a sensitive political, moral, and ethical issue.

"Rostow, Developing Economies, and National Security Policy," by John Lodewijks (pp. 285–310). Rostow was one of the few national security advisors with advanced training in economics, and his policy recommendations were consistent with his economic theory.